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Two Stories About Two Currencies of Care
HENDRIK HARTOG†
My work on the history of care has been shaped by a
desire, a yearning, to discover what the experience of
caregiving was like, both for the producers and the
consumers of that care. Of course what I found was never
that, exactly. Rather, at most, research uncovered
testimony about how the experience of care was described
and explored within the confines of litigation, or how the
experience of care was shaped or constituted by the legal
culture. Still, my semi-conscious goal was always to get as
close as I could to something that looked or smelled like
experience.
That desire, my yearning, is, of course, a very
unfashionable one and also one that much critical writing
(by, among others, Joan Scott) has all but eviscerated.1
Today that desire has become—or is recognized—as archaic
and outdated. The search for representative experience is so
last century. None of my graduate students would be stupid
enough to admit to such. And they are right, and I am
wrong.
Still, I am the product of a social historical moment. My
education as a historian was shaped—determined—by a
1970s historian’s fantasy that with sufficient work and
energy, I could find access to the “real” experiences of
ordinary people in everyday parts of their lives. I have
carried some version of that fantasy with me through most
of my working life as a historian. There have been precious
few instances when legal sources—particularly cases—could
 Unless otherwise indicated, portions of the following discussion have been
drawn from and expand upon scholarship reported in HENDRIK HARTOG,
SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE
(2012).
† Class of 1921 Bicentennial Professor in the History of American Law and
Liberty and Director of American Studies at Princeton University.
1. See Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of Experience, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 773,
797 (1991).
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possibly have satisfied that desire. But the desire, the
aspiration, for traces of experience, for something more than
discourse, for access to the everyday lives of real people, for
a way to reconstruct how they lived lives—how they worked
and fought and played and loved—in the present tense
(their present tense), that remains.2
Back around the turn of the new century, in 2000 and
2001 and 2002 and 2003, I began to work with a body of
nineteenth and early twentieth century New Jersey cases
that offered surprising and illuminating portraits of
carework within families. The cases involved disputes over
promised but undelivered legacies or inheritances. I had
begun reading them less out of a social historian’s fantasy
or yearnings and more because I had enjoyed teaching such
cases as legal doctrine in the days long past when I had
been a property law teacher. I was curious both about the
evolution of that legal doctrine and about the stories that
produced the legal doctrine.
But soon I was entranced—I still am—by the
descriptions of work scattered throughout the testimony in
the trial records, language that seemed to offer the access
into an intimate and lost world that I had long yearned for.
For historians of my generation and inclinations—at least
for this historian—such access was talismanic magic.
Reading the transcripts, I felt as if I could see, could smell,
could hear, the real. There’s nothing quite like a description
of how it feels to get hands dirty while giving a stepfather
by marriage an enema or what it means to wrestle a
demented aunt to the ground as she destroys the family
furniture.3 But how to make such images and stories parts
of a history, parts of an analysis of change over time? That
question stumped me, and it took me a very long time to
find answers, or ways to answer that question. And in the
end, you will have to accept that the book is my answer,
inadequate though it is.
Here, though, let me offer two stories, both as a way to
illustrate how the case files I dealt with “speak” or “spoke”
2. See Hendrik Hartog, Horwitz and the End of Socio-Legal History: 1975, in
2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY—LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND
METHODS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 43-44 (Alfred Brophy &
Daniel Hamilton eds., 2010).
3. HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY
INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 161, 255 (2012).
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about issues of care and the experience of caretaking and as
a way to connect the work I did to the more immediate and
twenty-first century concerns that shape the writings of my
brilliant copanelists. In particular, these stories suggest
how Americans once struggled over the contested boundary
between family member and worker. What did it mean to
“care”? What did it mean to do “carework”? What were the
expectations—the reliance interests—that arose within a
capitalist economy when men and women, usually women
but not only women, worked to take care of older relatives,
older family? What did they owe to those who had once
brought them up? What did it mean that those who did the
work also found a home within the households of those they
worked for?
These may not be questions that one wants raised in a
conference on careworkers, understood not as family
members but rather as part of a relatively un- or
underorganized labor pool, today made up largely of persons
of color, often participants in global labor movements.4
Although Klein and Boris describe recent efforts in some
states to compensate family members for staying home to
care (kin care), those family members are not the
centerpiece of their work.5 And if there is a carework
movement in the offing, it begins, I suspect, with efforts to
see careworkers, first of all, as workers like other workers,
as employees, entitled to the benefits that we wish were
part of the rewards that belonged to all workers within this
immensely wealthy and profligate society.
But Someday All This Will Be Yours, like much of my
work over the past two decades, was, in the first place, a
work of family history. Much of it is devoted to the legal,
moral, and emotional situations of adult children, some of
whom returned to a parental home after a period of time
working and living elsewhere, some of whom never left.
How to think about such beings: as adults, that is, as
persons competent to contract with parents and
grandparents to provide care? Or, as children, doing what is
expected of them within a household, perhaps hoping that
4. See EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 4-5 (2012); Eileen Boris &
Jennifer Klein, “We Have to Take it To the Top!”: Workers, State Policy, and the
Making of Home Care, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 293 (2013).
5. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 4, at 34, 49-53.
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eventually they would be remembered in a will? Can one
imagine such “children” as contractual actors, contracting
with parents for compensation? How did it feel to be stuck
at home, still dependent (or newly dependent) on a parent?
What were the rewards to which one became entitled?
Who was an adult child? Or, rather, who could be or
could become an adult child? Did the identity of an adult
child depend on birth, on being a blood relation? Nineteenth
and twentieth century literature—both legal literature and
imaginative literature—was littered with stories about
young women, and occasional men, who became adopted
children by doing the work of care. From Heidi to Little
Lord Fountleroy to Anne of Green Gables to Pip in Great
Expectations. All of them performed being daughters or
sons, and their performances made them into someone who
should be rewarded as a son or as a daughter because of the
work they did in caring for those who were their fictive kin.
Behind the romance of those stories lay an emotional or
existential fact: many older people were left alone,
abandoned by their children and grandchildren—their real
children and grandchildren, who had moved away and who
lived lives too far away to care.6 The mobility of nineteenth
century America, indeed, of the whole world, combined with
the instability of capitalist land markets, undid inherited
understandings that made staying home a reliable
expectation for adult children.7 And in a world—a social
order—in which old age care still depended on family, a
social order marked by the absence of the public structures
or the insurance schemes or the corporate marketing to the
old that mark our days, a social order that was then almost
entirely dependent on private law, older people had to make
someone else into their child if they had any hope of a
happy, that is, a cared-for old age.8 And adoptions—at first
only informally, later through formal legislative means—
became one way to solve the problem.9
But what of servants, employees, those who came into a
household not as “family,” or as potential “family,” but as
workers? (I should note that I experience so much wrong
6. See HARTOG, supra note 3, at 67.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 23-24.
9. Id. at 94.
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with that question the moment I type it into my computer,
so much unexamined. Everyone in a household was a
worker. That is, throughout the period I study, a family was
a place where work occurred. So the distinction between
worker and family member makes no sense. And as we will
see, the boundary between worker and family member, even
when made, was always hard to sustain. And because of the
deep commitment throughout the legal culture to the AngloAmerican idea of testator’s freedom, no “child,” even a direct
biological descendant, had anything more than a hope of
being remembered as an heir. No one was an heir until the
death of the testator. And any person in the household
could, in theory, be rewarded with an inheritance.)10
But what, to ask the question again, of servants and
employees? That question, however wrongheaded, does lead
us to the two stories I want to tell. So, let me begin:
***
Consider Cooper v. Colson (1904),11 a case that became
an important doctrinal precedent in New Jersey and
elsewhere.12 This was the case of a housekeeper, Margaret
Sayre, who had been promised one of her employer’s three
farms if only she would stay and care for him. She stayed
for more than two decades, never earning more than two or
three dollars a week, until his death from the consequences
of what we today would call dementia, perhaps Alzheimer’s.
She had relied on his promise to give her one of his three
farms, a promise repeated endlessly. But in the end, that
promise would not be fulfilled.
What services had she “performed” or “rendered” for the
old man? “I did all the work around the place, around the
house, I cooked for him, and I cooked for his men,—not all
the time, but at times I used to milk and I went out into the
fields to work, I dropped corn, and husked corn, and I
carried the sheaves of wheat and tied them together and
carried hay to the mow, and I pitched sheaves of wheat and
10. See id. at 68.
11. 58 A. 337 (N.J. 1904).
12. The material in the paragraphs that follow is drawn from the transcript
of the record of Cooper v. Colson. See Transcript of Record at 6-7, 24-27, 31-37,
42, 46, 52, 54-55, 66-67, 72, 121, 124-25, Cooper v. Colson, 58 A. 337 (N.J. 1904)
(the record is available at the New Jersey State Library in vol. 320, issue 6)
[hereinafter Cooper Record]; HARTOG, supra note 3, at 102-06, 185-92, 239-43.
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I did all that one day, and I used to separate the corn. . . .”
What did she do for him personally? “I used to cut his hair, I
had to give him his bath and attend to his clothes, and
waited on him every way I could.” For how long? “Ever since
I lived with him, until about a year before he died, I would
cut his hair every time it wanted it. . . . But the last summer
we were there I had to give him his bath just like a trained
nurse would have to do; he could not do it himself.” She
never received any extra compensation. Not even toward
the end, when she rented a small house in town where she
cared for him. “How long had he been queer and
troublesome on account of the softening of the brain . . . ?”
“When he got to be real funny, I suppose about six months.”
“[B]efore that time . . . was [he] any more trouble . . . than
an ordinary person would be?” “[O]nly at times. There
would be other times before that that he got so he didn’t
know how to get his clothes on and I would have to help
him.”
Many witnesses confirmed her testimony, both about
the work she did and the promises he had made. One
witness reported that the old man had frequently said “that
all he was giving her was the privilege of raising the poultry
for her services.” But, he continued, “if she remained with
him, [presumably until he died] . . . she shall be well repaid
for her services.” He expected “to deed her the little farm.”
Another witness testified: “[H]e wanted her to have a farm .
. . . [f]or being good to him, and working for him, and he
didn’t think anyone could do like Maggie did for him. . . .
[N]o ordinary hired girl would ever do for Mr. Colson what
Maggie Sayre did for Mr. Colson, as there ain’t one-half of
them cares, and she did care.” Over games of checkers and
while husking corn, he was always telling listeners that a
farm or “the” farm was going to be hers. Another witness
described how he had once asked the old man if he could
take some apples lying on the ground, “and he says: ‘I have
plenty of apples there on Maggie’s farm; if you want any, go
over there and get them.’ . . . and when I was there he came
up and said to me that that is Maggie’s farm.”13
After all the testimony had been taken, Vice Chancellor
Reed summarized how Margaret Sayre’s life had been
shaped by her relationship with Joseph Colson: She first
13. Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 36-37; see Cooper, 58 A. at 337; see also
Stone v. Todd, 8 A. 300, 305 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1887).
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went to work for him in 1872, when he lived on a rented
farm in Salem County. At the time she was paid three
dollars a week wages. In early 1875, he quit farming, and
she left and got a job elsewhere, in “service.” In 1876, Colson
went into the “marl” business. Marl was a loose and
crumbling earthy deposit consisting mainly of calcite or
dolomite, used as a fertilizer for soils deficient in lime.14
Demand for marl boomed as demand for fertilizer rose in
the farming areas of New Jersey.15 Margaret returned to
work as his housekeeper at two dollars a week, with the
understanding that after two years she would receive
whatever she could make from the poultry she kept, in place
of wages. But then Colson went back to farming. He bought
one farm in 1881 and asked her to raise chickens there for
one-half the profit. She refused the offer. Then he said that
if she would do as he wanted and stay with him, he would
leave her a farm. She accepted that offer. But a year and a
half later Margaret changed her mind and decided to move
to Montana. But again he convinced her to stay. Once again
he did so by promising that “if she stayed with him and took
care of him as long as he lived he would give her a farm.”
Over the next years, they continued to discuss which farm
she would take of the three he eventually owned. They lived
on one or another of those farms until the mid-1890s.
Throughout all those years, she did all kinds of work that
went well beyond what a housekeeper ordinarily did. And
when Joseph Colson became demented and unable to care
for himself at all, she moved into a house in town, in
Woodstown, where she nursed and cared for him, until just
before the end of his life, when he had to be moved into an
insane asylum. There he died, without a will.16
What did that history mean? To Vice Chancellor Reed,
it meant that all of the elements of a contract had been
proved.17 He ordered that the administrators of Colson’s
14. See New Jersey Marl, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1869, at 2.
15. See id. (describing the boom in the marl business).
16. See Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 120-22 (Vice Chancellor’s summary).
In the 1900 census, when they were living in Woodstown, she is listed as the
“head” of the household. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1900) (E.D. 187, Woodstown Borough,
Salem, New Jersey, sheet 1B).
17. Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 122.
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estate convey to her a deed to the “Peterson” farm, one of
the farms Colson owned at his death.
But the lawyers for the Colson estate appealed to the
New Jersey Court for the Correction of Errors and Appeals,
which reversed, by a vote of nine to two. Margaret Sayre
would not get her farm. The opinion by Justice Fort began
with an understanding, drawn from his reading of the
treatises, that there were two “acts” of part performance
that would take a “parol agreement” (that is, an oral
agreement) “out” of the Statute of Frauds and allow a court
of equity to decree specific performance. One such act was
“actual open possession” of the land or other property; the
other was “permanent and valuable improvement” made to
the land. Each of these he regarded as easy cases. He then
drew from the early New Jersey cases the conclusion that
there might in addition be “special acts of personal service
and the like” that, “when performed upon condition that
land would be conveyed,” might “entitle the party so
performing” to a decree for specific performance. The cases
revealed that when the result of “performance of the labor
and service under the agreement” had been “to change the
whole course of the life or life work” then the case was one
“within” the rule as to part performance, even without
possession of or improvements to the land.
But here there was no such transformation of a life.
Margaret Sayre was a housekeeper when she started; she
was a housekeeper at the time of Joseph Colson’s death. All
the work she did, including her intimate bodily care of her
long-time employer, was coherent with gendered
expectations of what such women did as routine aspects of
their lives, whether as paid employees or as kin. There was
no doubt, Fort conceded, that Margaret had served Colson
“in part, though not wholly, in reliance upon compensation
by way of the conveyance of a farm.” But nothing she had
done was either “exceptional nor extraordinary. . . . She in
no way changed her mode of living or course of life or life
work.” And so she would not get the farm she had been
promised.18
Fort’s much cited opinion was read by lawyers and
judges to restate a test that required “exceptional” tasks as
the proof of a life transformed. Certainly for anyone who
18. Cooper, 58 A. at 339.
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was not a blood relative. Performing tasks that were
coherent or predictable within roles or jobs assumed within
a family failed that test. Proof of the work done was by itself
never enough. One had to demonstrate that the work done
could only be explained by the prior presence of a promise to
convey property. Everything Margaret Sayre had done was
just work, perhaps work for which pay was expected, but
not work that earned one a legacy of a farm.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, men who gave
up jobs or careers to care for older property owners at
“home” often were understood as having passed that test.
Returning home had become, in the culture and in the law,
an exceptional undertaking, at least for young men who
ordinarily left home and entered labor markets. By contrast,
women who gave up or put off marriages to stay and to care
for older relatives or employers were not often recognized as
having made such an undertaking. There were too many
possible routine and unexceptional reasons why a marriage
had not occurred. Specific performance required an unusual
story and an unusual relationship, an undertaking that
could only be understood through the lens of an
unquestioned promise to convey valuable property.
The court in Cooper did acknowledge that Margaret
should probably succeed if she went back to court and sued
quantum meruit for unpaid wages, though the amount she
could get (certainly, much less than a farm!) would be
limited by statutes of limitation and would possibly only
incorporate her work in the last years as Colson’s nurse.19 A
housekeeper would not, however, ordinarily become an
heiress, that is, someone entitled to land or other property.20
Consider then, as my second story, a slightly later case,
Frean v. Hudson, which did involve a suit quantum meruit,
after a woman was disappointed by an employer’s will.21
Julia Frean went to court after she discovered that Cornelia
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The material in the paragraphs that follow is drawn from Frean v.
Hudson, 93 A. 582, 582-83 (N.J. 1915). See Transcript of Record at 1, 4-9. 12-13.
15-16, 19-20, 26, 30, 35, 40, 48-54, 57-58, 65-67, 70-96, 99, 103-05, Frean v.
Hudson, 93 A. 582 (N.J. 1915) (the record is available at the New Jersey State
Library the record is available at the New Jersey State Library in vol. 636, issue
5) [hereinafter Frean Record]; see also HARTOG, supra note 3, at 239-51.
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Hudson had left her only a pittance. Julia had been
Cornelia’s companion. She had lived in Cornelia’s household
in Bayonne for more than twenty years, ever since she had
failed her teacher’s examinations in Staten Island, where
she had grown up. She was no relation of Cornelia Hudson;
her parents had been Cornelia’s friends.
After Cornelia Hudson’s death in 1913 at the age of
eighty-four, a codicil to her will was found to include a gift
of $100 to Julia, “as an act of friendship . . . which she is to
forfeit if she sues my estate or my heirs, as she has no claim
whatever against me or against my estate.” Julia, who had
expected much more from the will and who believed that
Cornelia’s son, Edward Hudson, had fraudulently inserted
the codicil into the will, protested. Edward, who was
executor of Cornelia’s estate, offered Julia $500, “to pacify
her.” At first she accepted the offer. But then she repudiated
it. And then she sued, asking compensation based on six
years of work as Cornelia’s “housekeeper and companion” at
twenty-five dollars a month (the temporal limit of what she
could ask for, given the statute of limitations on such
actions), plus three and one half years of work as a nurse at
an additional fifteen dollars a week. A Hudson County jury
awarded her $4159.18.22
On appeal to the New Jersey Court of Errors, Elmer
Demarest, the lawyer for the estate and for Edward
Hudson, asked the court to reverse, on the theory that the
trial judge should never have let the case go to the jury. His
brief began by insisting that Julia had been “practically a
member” of Cornelia’s family, and had always been “treated
as such” by all the members of the household. (Indeed, in a
later passage in the brief, she was described as treated
better than other members of the family (which meant son
Edward, who was the only other recognized member of the
household.)) “No closer relationship can be imagined
between persons without consanguinity, than that which
the respondent [that is, Julia Frean] admits existed
between her and Mrs. Hudson.” Julia, the brief continued,
was no nurse. She was “59 years of age, lame, and had no
experience as a nurse.” She knew perfectly well that “the
services she was performing were given as though she were
a member of the family.” She was no servant; she ate at the
22. See Frean Record, supra note 21, at 70-71, 88-89. Statutes of limitations
precluded her from asking for more than six years of work. Id. at 3.
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table with other family members. She and Cornelia acted as
“mother and daughter.” Julia understood herself as
possessing “an equal right in the household with the other
members of the family.” What she did within the household
she did “because of her affection and friendship for”
Cornelia. She might have hoped for a legacy, but she knew,
or ought to have known, that the “tenderness” with which
Cornelia “cared for her” should have been enough. And she
should have realized that testator’s freedom meant that
Cornelia was free to choose to give all of her estate to her
son, while excluding Julia.23 The main ground of appeal
then was that Julia’s “admission that the position of the
parties were in loco parentis” barred her right to anything
more than the love and appreciation she had received from
Cornelia Hudson. Thus there should have been a nonsuit.24
At trial, one year earlier, the work that Julia Frean had
done for Cornelia Hudson had been described by a maid who
had long done housework for elderly Cornelia. What had
Julia done for Cornelia? Helped her do the cleaning, helped
do the housekeeping and running of the house, everything
except washing and ironing. And then, after that, Julia sat
with Cornelia; she did sewing and crocheting, and all the
mending, “besides waiting on Mrs. Hudson.” She also went
out on errands for Cornelia, who never left the house. The
maid had overheard many conversations between Cornelia
and Julia, with regard to payment for services. Cornelia
apparently often said “she would give it to her [that is, to
Julia] if she had it[,] but she did not have it on account of
her son, Ed Hudson, taking it from her.” When he crossexamined her, Demarest had led the maid to describe how
Mrs. Hudson and Miss Frean, and sometimes Edward
Hudson, all sat down together at meal times. He was
pointedly distinguishing the maid as a paid employee from
Julia, whom he characterized as family. Two next door
neighbors had added detailed portraits of the work Julia
Frean did, including material on her serving at the table,
clearing, dusting, getting rooms cleaned, cleaning the
23. Id. at 5-6.
24. Id. at 5-6, 8-9. She was listed as a part of Cornelia’s household in both the
1900 and 1910 censuses. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1900) (E.D. 8, Dist. 1, Bayonne City,
Ward 3, Hudson, New Jersey, sheet 1A); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1910) (Bayonne City,
Ward 3, Hudson, New Jersey, sheet 5A).
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silverware, and taking care of the son’s clothes and his dogs.
On cross-examination, though, Demarest had asked the
first neighbor if she had ever seen Julia do any work that a
member of that family would not do as one family member
for another. The second was challenged to justify Julia’s
claims that she did the work of a professional nurse.25
Cornelia Hudson’s long time physician had testified
that he considered Julia Frean to have been Cornelia
Hudson’s “nurse and attendant.” What nursing work had
been necessary? He answered: Cornelia Hudson could not
“go upstairs or outside without someone with her.” She was
troubled with dropsy. That is, her limbs were swollen below
the knees, making it almost impossible for her to get from
chair to bed. “I would not have considered her a safe woman
in the last five or six years.” Toward the end, she was not
able to attend to her person. Most of the time she had
control of her bowels, but not always. Then Julia attended
and cleaned up. Julia, he concluded, had been a good nurse.
But he thought there had been much conflict in the house
about the question of payment to her. In cross-examination,
Demarest asked the doctor whether the services Julia had
provided were not ones that any “woman member of the
household could ordinarily perform?” No, he answered,
“[n]ot in the last two or three years.” What made her good at
what she did? Well, in part that she had done it for a long
time. She knew Cornelia’s “habits, her nervous makeup and
her physical condition better than any one else would.” No
one else could have done it. Was Julia like a daughter?
Demarest tried again. He never thought of her that way, the
doctor answered; he “considered her as a [paid] companion
and as a nurse in the household.”26 Julia Frean had then
testified. She too detailed all the work she done, including
directing the servant in the household work. She did all the
mending, and she would go out to do the marketing. She
had expected to be paid for her time, but she wasn’t,
although she did receive two dollars a week for taking care
of Edward Hudson’s dogs. After 1910, in her rendition of the
facts, she had taken full charge of Mrs. Hudson’s bodily
care: bathed her every morning, clothed her, and fed her,
and she had had to change her bedding. Cornelia sometimes
25. Frean Record, supra note 21, at 40.
26. Id. at 48-50.
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soiled the bed. She did all the work usually done “in an
invalid’s room.”
Demarest had reserved the right to object to her
testimony, since it was an open question whether a plaintiff
could testify in her own case. But then he cross-examined
her about her treatment within the family. He had her walk
across the courtroom to demonstrate how lame she was. Too
much so, he implied, to have been a real, that is, a paid
nurse. She insisted she had been lame only for the past few
years. They then went back through Julia and Cornelia’s
life together. She had been remembered at holidays with
gifts, and she had given gifts to other members of the
family, and she sat with them in the evenings. She was
certainly no servant consigned to the back rooms. When
Cornelia Hudson still travelled, Julia Frean accompanied
her, and they stayed in hotel rooms together. For years she
had not been paid, but she did “fancy work” that she sold,
and she paid for her own clothing. Julia described in detail
all Cornelia’s excuses not to pay her. Why then, Demarest
asked, had she stayed? “Because she never wanted me to
leave her, and at last she was so sick I could not leave her.”
Cornelia Hudson was very fond of her, treated her as a
member of the family. And she considered herself a member
of the family.
At that moment, one of Julia’s two lawyers had
Demarest repeat the question, presumably to give her a
chance to realize what she was saying, since all knew that a
family member, as such, had no expectation of pay. This
time she answered that she was only treated as a family
member by Cornelia Hudson, not by others in the
household. The services were “performed” for Cornelia
alone. Demarest asked again, “you considered that the
services that you were performing for her . . . were as
though you were a member of her family, as of her
household, did you not?” She had answered, “Yes.” He
repeated the question, then moved on. Had Cornelia
Hudson become like a mother to her? “Yes, she was like a
mother to me.” “You had no mother, had you?” She had
answered: “No.” The occasional spending money you
received from her, “you looked upon as spending money, the
same as she would give . . . to any member of her family?”
Julia answered, “Yes, between ourselves.” He pressed again:
“You considered yourself, so far as she was concerned, a
member of her household, did you not? . . . Practically a
member of the family, with the possible distinction that you
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were not a blood relative?” She answered, “No.” She did not
believe herself a blood relative. But had she felt on an equal
level with other members of the family because of what
Cornelia Hudson was doing for her and what she was doing
for Cornelia? “Yes.” (One might imagine that Julia thought
she was showing Edward that she was a better child to
Cornelia than Edward had been.) At that moment, one of
her lawyers tried to intervene, on the theory that Julia
evidently did not understand the questions posed (or the
implications that could be drawn from her answers). The
questioning went on: There was much conflict about money
in Cornelia’s last years. Julia tried to raise the possibility
that Edward Hudson had forged the codicil to the will. She
insisted that Cornelia Hudson had promised to take care of
her in her will.
Demarest then returned to the question what had
motivated her to remain and to care: “And up to that time
you were rendering to Mrs. Hudson these services because
of your love and your affection and friendship for her, the
same as you had done for a number of years previous,
depending upon her to give you at the time she died some
legacy?” Her answer: “Yes, she always said she would.” She
had known she could not depend for support on the other
members of the family. It was only when she found out how
little she got that she had become dissatisfied. Until then
she had never expressed dissatisfaction? “No, because she
[Cornelia] always said she would take care of me.”
Demarest: “You felt while you were living with Mrs. Hudson
that she was doing as much for you as you were for her?”
Answer: “She died in my arms.” Question: “But you felt that
the tenderness with which Mrs. Hudson cared for you and
the fact that she was giving you a home from the time you
had been unfortunate [presumably, here he was referring
back to when she had been fired from a teaching position],
was equal to anything that you could do for Mrs. Hudson in
return, did you?” Her lawyer intervened again, because the
witness was “a little upset.” (And one can presume he feared
she was about to destroy her case for compensation.) She
took a moment to compose herself. Then she answered:
“Yes.” (One can only imagine the slumped shoulders of the
lawyer at that moment.)
On redirect, that is, when her lawyers regained the
opportunity to question her, they had worked to reclaim
ground. Under their questioning Julia described how, in
Cornelia’s last years, her nursing services took up every
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hour of the day. She would be up several times at night, and
there was no one brought in to relieve her. When had she
become lame? “Oh, when I was taken sick, and then when I
fell working for her and doing—I was worn out working for
her and then I fell, and I have been lame ever since.” It
happened in 1911. How much had her fancy work earned for
her? Answer: Only forty dollars, earned one winter knitting
sweaters.
On recross, under questioning again from Demarest for
the other side, she had admitted that if Cornelia Hudson
were still living she would not have sued. She had brought
suit only because of the way she had been treated by
Cornelia’s child. This, once again, could be read as a
concession that she had no contract with Cornelia. But then
there had been one more set of questions from her lawyers
(on re-redirect): Why wouldn’t she be suing if Cornelia
Hudson were still alive? “Because I expect I should be living
with her yet, kept right on taking care of her.” She did tell
Cornelia once, though, that she would wait until she was
gone, and “then I would sue her. I said I would not worry
you now, she was worried enough.”27 In spite of Demarest’s
efforts during the trial, in spite of her own concessions that
love had shaped her conduct and her identity as a member
of Cornelia Hudson’s family, Julia Frean won. As is always
the case, the written transcript cannot fully convey what
the judges and the jury saw and what they knew to be
“true.” And effective lawyering can only go so far. We can
surmise that Julia’s expressions of love for Cornelia did not,
in the end, counter perceptions of the fundamental
unfairness of the will Cornelia Hudson had signed (whether
or not it was an expression of her intentions). Justice
Bergen, who wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court of
Errors and Appeals, rejected Demarest’s argument that
there should have been a nonsuit, that the judge in the
Hudson County court should never have allowed a jury to
consider the question of whether Julia Frean was entitled to
compensation. Demarest’s interpretation of the law “that no
contract to pay can be inferred from services when the
plaintiff was a member of the decedent’s family,” was
answered by the fact that Julia “was not a relative in any
degree” of Cornelia Hudson. The evidence was not
conclusive that the services she had provided were intended
27. Frean Record, supra note 21, at 105-06.
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as “gratuitous.” There was a “fair inference” to be drawn
from the testimony that there had been “an express promise
to pay what the services were reasonably worth.” And in
any case these were questions that could properly be
submitted to the jury.
***
These two cases help make a conventional historian’s
point—actually, two points that historians make
conventionally. The first is that the past is a foreign
country, filled with practices from which we today are
estranged. I will at the end of this Essay return to this
point, to challenge it or at least to complicate it. The second
is that people living in the past had complex moral lives, as
complex and sophisticated as our own. A primary mistake
many make about the past is to assume the simplicity of
those living there, in contrast to our own sophistication.
Thus, some, usually on the left, assume that those in the
past took care of others solely because of oppression, in the
absence of the protections of the state, while others, usually
on the right, assume that once upon a time there was a
working private family where caretaking happened more or
less naturally.
In the period in the history of caretaking that I explored
in my book, relative/nonrelative described both a crucial
and absolute boundary and highly contested and complex
space. On one side, on the side of nonrelatives, lay a
familiar world of contract and (theoretically, at least) of
arms length bargaining, a world shaped by a familiar and
marketized economic order.28 Workers were paid. Maids
were paid. By the early twentieth century, those who
provided nursing care were paid. Farmworkers were paid.
And all were paid wages.29 They were not paid enough; they
did not achieve respect. But they were paid.
On the other side, on the familial side, lay a world that
is partially familiar but largely lost to us. We would
recognize some aspects of their lives. They, like us, found
negotiations for compensation within families discomforting
and easily challenged.30 Spouses and other intimate
members of families in particular should not, most believed,
28. HARTOG, supra note 3, at 7, 14.
29. See id. at 232-33, 264.
30. Id. at 28-29.
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make care contingent on hard bargaining.31 There was then
and now a strong doctrinal presumption that the ordinary
things that one family member did for one another,
including ordinary caretaking, were done without
expectations of compensation.32 What was or was not
“ordinary” care was—then and now—a matter of ongoing
litigation and uncertainty.33 There was always an array of
arguments and understandings available to challenge an
expectation that family members should pay salaries to one
another for providing care. Love, we might say, should rule,
at least sometimes.34
And yet, to shift to the lost or the relatively unfamiliar
features of that world: nineteenth and early twentieth
century family life was never conceptually separated from
economic—working—life.35 That may be our understanding
or fantasy, but it was not theirs. A nineteenth century or
early twentieth century household was filled with workers,
some of whom were blood relations.36 What distinguished
family members from non-family members was not a
distinction on the order of nonwork/work or love/work—
because everybody worked.37 Rather, the intimate family
was organized using the currency of legacies, and that
currency had its own rules and practices.38 (Note my
dependence on the work of my colleague Viviana Zelizer.)39
Or, to be more precise, there would be some workers who
would be paid in cash, like the maid in Frean v. Hudson or
31. Id.
32. See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 182-87 (1998);
Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’
Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2191-96 (1994). This
literature has been framed by the problem of pay-for wives; much less has been
done on children’s labor in and out of the home. See STEVEN MINTZ, HUCK’S
RAFT: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD 152-53 (2004).
33. HARTOG, supra note 3, at 206-07.
34. Id. at 10, 33, 279.
35. Id. at 278-79.
36. Id. at 279.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 279-80.
39. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14-15 (2005); VIVIANA A.
ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 2, 25 (1994).
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the farmworkers in Cooper v. Colson. In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries some of these would have been
known as casual laborers.40 But there might also be
workers, members of the family, who would be paid by way
of legacies, through inheritance.41 Margaret and Julia
belonged, at least in their own minds and in the arguments
of their lawyers, to that second class. The boundary between
those classes within the household was fraught and
contested. But it was also real.42
Let’s posit that in some sense Julia Frean and Margaret
Sayre were both servants. We don’t know the intimacies of
Julia’s relationship with Cornelia, or, rather, we only know
some of them; nor that of Margaret with Joseph Colson. We
know two things about them and about how they lived:
there were others in or connected to the household who
were just or merely servants—men and women who worked
for cash; and we know that Julia and Margaret had become
something else, something more; just as many who do
carework today become something else, something more,
because of the intimacy and the continuities and the love
that shapes their work lives. Julia and Margaret marked
that something else—their membership in that other
class—in many ways. Margaret called Colson “uncle.”43
Julia worked hard to make manifest her equality with and
similarity to Cornelia’s son.44
And yet the most important way they had of marking
their difference from mere servants rested in the lawsuits
they created and pursued: their assumption that the
relevant economic currency for their work lay in
inheritance, the very fact that they waited until their
“employer’s” death, before seeking compensation.45
In my research, I found case after case where older
people (like Joseph Colson and Cornelia Hudson) avoided
paying cash for the care they needed. During life, cash was
not how one paid for care—certainly not for intimate care
40. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR 19-21 (1991).
41. HARTOG, supra note 3, at 104-05.
42. Id. at 101-06.
43. Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 59-60.
44. Frean Record, supra note 21, at 75-79.
45. HARTOG, supra note 3, at 28.
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within a household.46 But it would be wrong to assume that
they and those who cared for them were not participating in
economic transactions. The promises older people made
were understood, and were meant to be understood, as
commitments—contingent commitments, a property lawyer
would say—but still commitments.47 They drew younger
careworkers into work that was needed; and the promises
kept them from leaving.48 And the cases I read were almost
universally the detritus left from those transactions.
Both workers and “employers” would have understood
the rules of the game of legacies. At least in the AngloAmerican legal world, certainly so in nineteenth and early
twentieth century New Jersey, the trump of testator’s
freedom often played a determinative role in determining
ultimate entitlements to family wealth.49 But testator’s
freedom (real, though bounded by a variety of rules and
limitations), the fact that many workers would not get what
they thought they were working for, was no more a denial of
the reality of the economic relationship than the
employment at will doctrine or the entireties doctrine was a
denial of contractual freedom in the non-familial world of
labor relations.50 It was, rather, a shaping part of the rules
of the game in which older people and careworkers—
workers like Julia and Margaret—participated.
Of course, part of what made it complicated to play the
game of working for a legacy was the cultural overlay—
composed out of romanticism and evangelical Protestantism
and notions of separate spheres and so much else—that
made the family appear as a space where work occurred as
a response to need, without calculations of pay at all.51
Moreover, workers like Julia and Margaret always had to
confront a set of legal and equitable presumptions that
made near blood relatives presumptive legatees.52 Lawyer
Demarest tried to turn those cultural and legal overlays
46. Id. at 103-04.
47. Id. at 7, 10.
48. Id. at 5-6.
49. Id. at 250-51.
50. Id. at 67-68.
51. Id. at 121-22.
52. Id. at 70-71.
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into a trap for Julia Frean, and often (as one saw with
Julia) litigants had themselves apparently internalized
those understandings into their own contradictory and
ambivalent understandings of their positions as working
family members.53
And yet, women like Julia Frean and Margaret Sayre
were also perfectly capable of holding both their love of their
employers and their sense of entitlement to compensation
for work done together. It seems to me that they lived at the
same time in at least two moral universes. And many of
them managed the burden of negotiating around and
between those two moral universes with remarkable skill.
In one universe, that of the family/household, they
earned rewards—moral and spiritual rewards, as well as
material rewards—by sharing in a common family
enterprise. The material rewards of having invested in the
family might be frustrated. Older people—those in control of
family property—usually did not have to act in accord with
promises made or with apparent commitments and
investments. Testator’s freedom remained something close
to a trump card. The property owner, the older person,
retained the right to change his or her mind, to deny
promised rewards. There was no legal duty to share in the
end. And the fights after death might have ruined the moral
and spiritual rewards of family life, at least retrospectively.
But within the moral economy of the family, women like
Margaret and Julia earned rewards, if rewards were
earned, by joining in, by being a loving member of an
ongoing family unit. Remember Margaret Sayre’s
description of the varieties of work that she did. They
justified themselves within that normative universe by
showing
exclusive
loyalty,
by
submerging
their
independence as competent adults, by emphasizing their
continuing place in the family. (It is, therefore, not
surprising that so many adult daughters and other women
who served as caretakers—including Margaret Sayre—also
put off marriage until parental or older employer’s death.)54
53. See Frean Record, supra note 21, at 78.
54. Transcript of Record at 28-29, Hattersley v. Bissett, 29 A. 187 (N.J. 1894);
Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 83; see Ridgway v. English, 22 N.J.L. 409, 41617 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1850); Transcript of Record at 52, 58, 63, Petty v. Young, 9 A.
377 (N.J. 1887).
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In the other universe, on the other hand, in the
normative universe that a suit for compensation quantum
meruit to a common law court or a petition for specific
performance to a court of equity articulated, rights and
identities as independent and contractually competent
actors took priority. Subordination within the household
was inconsistent with an adulthood that produced a
successful cause of action. As was too much love. As Alexis
De Tocqueville had famously put it, in describing the effect
of inheritance on the lives of young American men, “[a]s the
family is felt to be a vague, indeterminate, uncertain
conception, each man concentrates on his immediate
convenience.”55
A good plaintiff’s lawyer ordinarily worked to cabin a
client within the second moral universe and to suppress the
often multitudinous traces of the first. But as we have also
seen, the complexities of real lives kept leaking out into the
testimony. And that made the lawyer’s work difficult.
Revelations of sharing, caring, and love could become
destructive to the case the lawyer wanted to make.
Remember the anxious interventions of Julia Frean’s
attorney as she described her love for Cornelia Hudson. But
in the hands of a clever lawyer, it was even possible to turn
testimony about how subordinated, how submerged, an
adult child had been, into support for a successful right to
individual compensation. Just as no competent individual or
adult would have accepted the discipline of the factory floor
without the expectation of pay, so it was with the adult
child within the household. Margaret stayed; she did not go
to Montana. She hardly received any compensation. She
relied on Joseph Colson’s promise that she would have a
farm. One ironic consequence of subordination and loyalty
within the family was that it could occasionally become
implicit proof of a labor agreement between older person
and younger family member. Someone like Julia Frean
would not have stayed and done all that work, accepted a
role as a “dependent,” if she hadn’t expected to be paid.
For those on the other side, for lawyers and their
clients—executors and administrators of estates, as well as
55. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 51-55 (George Lawrence
ed., J.P. Mayer trans., 1969). On justification within moral universes, see LUC
BOLTANSKI & LAURENT THÉVENOT, ON JUSTIFICATION: ECONOMIES OF WORTH 16478 (Catherine Porter trans., 2006).
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siblings and others who opposed careworkers’ claims to
property or compensation—there were many ways to mark
such employees who had become wannabee legatees as
something else—as greedy or ungrateful, as morally obtuse
or dishonest, as forgetful of the primary moral universe in
which they had actually spent their lives. Because of bad
legal advice or because of their own moral deficiencies,
these “family members” had insisted on rights to property
or to payment. Instead, they should have understood
themselves as privileged to have been part of loving homes.
Or, they ought to have recognized themselves as gift givers,
not as crass contractors. They were people who had done
good deeds as individuals, in caring for older people. It
sullied and darkened their moral status that they were now
insisting on compensation for what they once had given
voluntarily and freely, out of the goodness of their hearts,
out of love. And always there lurked the question whether
what they claimed now had been solemnly sworn and
promised
commitments—contracts—had
really
been
something else earlier, before death and litigation. Was it
only after the fact—sometimes many years after the fact,
after the relevant speakers were dead—that mere talk had
been reconstructed into contracts?
***
Does any of this resonate with the experience of
careworkers today? Are these dilemmas and negotiations
ones that simply belong to a past that is gone? The weird
practices of a now lost or forgotten foreign country?
Certainly, the world of care now looks so very different
than the world I reconstructed out of the New Jersey cases.
Institutionally and politically, old age is today shaped by a
pervasive commercialized and corporate health care system,
by the identification of the old as the targets of corporate
greed and commercial growth, by a pervasive state
bureaucracy, and by the increasing presence of a global
migratory army of careworkers. All of that makes carework
look very different, and makes plausible the public policies
that Peggie Smith argues for, which would attach
careworkers to the political institutions identified with
other forms of work, ones away from “the home.”56
56. See Peggie R. Smith, Who Will Care for the Elderly?: The Future of Home
Care, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 323 (2013).
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And in general, for almost everyone, the economy of
inheritance, the game of working for a legacy, has
disappeared as a plausible life strategy. It certainly would
make no sense, or little sense, as framing the work
expectations, the reliance interests, to those who do home
care today. There may once have been a language and a
currency used to mark carework, framed by the presence of
inheritance as a life strategy. That currency no longer
exists.
So, it all seems so very different, although I would
expect (and ethnographic and other research confirms) that
the contradictions that Julia Frean experienced are not that
different from those that many careworkers experience
today. When carework occurs “within” families (whatever
“within” might mean) and when one is—when one
understands oneself—as having become a family member,
the boundaries between what one does out of love or routine
or habit or custom or gendered expectations or whatever
and what one does because one will be paid for it, will be
experienced as confusing and uncertain, complicated. Still,
the answer to the question, who is a family member, is not
available today. Few today assume that a family member is
one whose expectation of pay was through inheritance.
And I think that absence helps describe a huge divide
between then and now. At least that divide shaped how I
framed the book I wrote.
And yet, from the time I began working on this material
and giving talks about carework and old age to various
audiences, I have had people in the audience tell me that I
am wrong, that the stories I tell speak to them, not as exotic
travel reports from a distant “foreign country,” but as
articulations of familiar facts in their own moral and
emotional lives.
What lessons should we draw from those “experiences”?
How lost is the past that I explored? And to return to where
I began, what should be the enterprise of reconstructing the
experience of carework, past and present?

